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 “Forging New Malay networks”
Imagining global halal markets 
Johan Fischer
Abstract: Th is article explores Malaysia’s bid to become the world leader in rap-
idly expanding halal (literally, “lawful” or “permitted”) markets on a global scale 
through the embedding of a particular global Islamic imagination. Th e Malaysian 
state has become central to the certifi cation, standardization, and bureaucratiza-
tion of Malaysian halal production, trade, and consumption. Th e vision is now 
to export this model, and for that purpose the network as a strategic metaphor 
is being evoked to signify connectedness and prescriptions of organization vis-
à-vis more deep-rooted networks. I argue that an imagined global halal network 
conditions the halal commodity form. Th is imagination is at least as important 
as halal commodities themselves for the emergence of a novel form of globalized 
halal capitalism. 
Keywords: halal, Malaysia, Malays, markets, networks 
Th e quotation that forms part of this article’s ti-
tle is from a young Malay(sian) Muslim woman, 
Jeti, who is currently involved in promoting ha-
lal commodities in the United Kingdom for the 
Malaysian state through her private consultancy 
company. She is an example of a Malay mid-
dle-class entrepreneur with a global orientation, 
and represents a modern type of Malay dias-
poric group privileged by the Malaysian state. 
Jeti’s quotation also signals the ways in which 
networking takes place between the state, entre-
preneurs, and markets involved in promoting 
Malaysian halal commodities. I fi rst met Jeti at 
Malaysia International Halal Showcase (MIHAS) 
2006, which was held at the massive Malaysian 
International Exhibition & Convention Centre 
located outside Malaysia’s capital city, Kuala 
Lum pur. MIHAS 2006 was “themed” as “Net-
working, Consolidating and Energising.” I also 
had the opportunity to meet Jeti at the Halal 
Exhibition at the World Food Market (WFM) 
held in London in November 2006 and at simi-
lar events in Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
over the years. She held UK degrees in account-
ing and business studies and was currently in-
volved in promoting halal for the Malaysian 
state by organizing trade promotions, as well as 
with her private company. Of particular inter-
est to Jeti was the promising UK market, which 
she knew from her studies and which fi gures so 
prominently in the Malaysian state’s halal vision. 
She also refl ects the ways in which networking 
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is involved in proliferating halal and embedding 
the economy in a particular Malaysian imagina-
tion related to Islam. Since we fi rst met at what I 
shall call halal network events, the globalization 
of the market for halal products and services 
has intensifi ed. MIHAS and WFM are signifi -
cant examples of such halal network events, that 
is, major public events or “stages” where the 
corporate sector and entrepreneurs, academia, 
NGOs, Islamic organizations, halal certifi ers, and 
governments from around the world come to-
gether to promote and spread the sale of halal 
commodities globally.
Th is article argues that an imagined global 
halal network conditions the halal commodity 
form. Th is imagination is at least as important 
as halal commodities themselves for the emer-
gence of a novel form of globalized halal capi-
talism. A central question in this article relates 
to the Malaysian state’s eff orts to develop and 
dominate a global market in halal commod-
ities through networking entrepreneurs and 
how these entrepreneurs in London respond to 
and are aff ected by this eff ort. Th ere is a body 
of literature on the relationship between Islam, 
modernity, networking, and entrepreneurship 
among the Malays in Malaysia (Sloane 1999), 
but how such relationships in a diaspora con-
text are embedded in a particular global Islamic 
imagination is not well understood. It is this is-
sue this article explores.
In the global halal market, Malaysia plays an 
essential role in “embedding” halal in network 
fantasies and imaginations, as well as discourses 
about piety and proper practices among Mus-
lims. Only recently have these markets become 
global in scope, and states, manufacturers, restau-
rants, shops, certifi ers, and consumers around 
the world are faced with ever stricter and more 
complex requirements within a framework of 
moral economies. Global halal markets are ex-
amples of modern religious or moral economies 
that are embedded in social action, for example, 
production, trade, consumption, and regulation 
in organizations and networks.
Th e fi eldwork for this study has produced a 
multisited ethnography involving Kuala Lum-
pur and London. Participant observation and 
interviewing were carried out among produc-
ers, traders, Islamic organizations, companies, 
food and Islamic authorities, restaurant own-
ers, halal entrepreneurs, imams (Muslim men 
who lead the prayers in a mosque), and Malay 
Muslim middle-class consumers. I also draw on 
material from another ongoing research proj-
ect that explores how global halal production, 
trade, and regulation are taking place in the in-
terfaces between Islam, states, and markets in 
Malaysia and Singapore, but also globally. 
Th is article is divided into nine sections. 
Following this introduction, I will conceptual-
ize capitalism, embeddedness, and networks in 
global halal markets. Th en I discuss globalized 
halal markets before moving on to how halal 
networks and entrepreneurs play an essential 
role in this market. Th e next section explores 
halal embeddedness in Malaysia and beyond, 
and these themes are closely linked to the next 
two sections on halal network events in Malaysia 
and on the global stage. Th e section on entre-
preneurs at work in London looks at how net-
works and networking have become essential in 
the diaspora. Th e conclusion ties the fi ndings 
of the article together and refl ects on how net-
works are given new expression in the interfaces 
between Islam, state, and market.
Conceptualizing capitalism, 
embeddedness, and networks 
in global halal markets
In this article, I draw on two understandings of 
capitalism. First, I am inspired by Laura Bear 
and colleagues’ (2015) argument that global 
capitalism is formed through relational perfor-
mances of productive powers that exceed for-
mal economic models, practices, boundaries, 
and market devices. Th e authors explore how 
capitalism’s social relations are generated out of 
divergent life projects as well as the contingent, 
fragile, and intimate networks of capitalism. 
Second, I understand modern halal capitalism 
as “millennial capitalism,” that is, capitalism in 
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its messianic, salvifi c, and magical manifesta-
tions (Comaroff  and Comaroff  2000: 293). In 
many ways, my ethnography fi ts well with cen-
tral points discussed in that article. Th e religious 
aspects of millennial capitalism are central. Oc-
cult economies are economies with a material 
aspect based on the eff ort to conjure wealth or 
to account for its accumulation by appealing to 
techniques that defy practical reason and ethical 
aspects transmitted in moral discourses gener-
ated by production of value through magical 
means. Th is is also the case concerning the way 
in which such economies have become a major 
focus of popular attention with respect to the 
place of the arcane in the everyday production 
of value (2000: 310). I think these understand-
ings of capitalism capture well the way in which 
the halal network is imagined.
I explore “embeddedness,” that is, the notion 
that all economic activity is situated within the 
context of broader social, cultural, and political 
relations, with a specifi c empirical focus on global 
fl ows and capitalist networks of halal commod-
ities and practices. Modern and global halal 
production, trade, regulation, and consumption 
are examples of a particular embeddedness—
specifi c and observable forms of economic ac-
tions that take place in the interfaces between 
broader social, cultural, and political relations. 
Karl Polanyi (1944) found “market society” to 
be disembedded from sociocultural networks. I 
explore halal commodities as “things with a par-
ticular type of social potential” (Appadurai 1999: 
6); that is, halal commodities live social lives 
among the people who produce, sell, and con-
sume them, and this conditions halal networks 
and, ultimately, specifi c forms of embeddedness. 
Manuel Castells (2000: 469) argues that the 
new information technology paradigm provides 
the material basis for the expansion of the net-
working form in the entire social structure lo-
cally, nationally, and globally. Th at is, networks 
and networking are essential tools for embed-
ding individuals, social groups, organizations, 
states, and nations in particular global imagina-
tions. Th e importance of “hubs” is to produce 
the strategic functions of the network—“com-
munication hubs” are “exchangers” that play “a 
role of coordination for the smooth interaction 
of all the elements integrated into the network” 
(2000: 443). However, I focus more on how 
halal networks can contribute to and move be-
yond such broader theoretical and conceptual 
debates on globalization and capitalism. Under-
standings of “network society” is important for 
the way in which Malaysia envisions the halal 
network and not so much as an analytical tool 
of my own.
A critical infl uence on my work is Annelise 
Riles’s (2000) study of the participation of Fijian 
women in the United Nations’ fourth global fo-
rum. One of Riles’s central insights is that “the 
eff ectiveness of the Network is generated by the 
Network’s self-description … the naming of a 
Network is the existence of a Network, and the 
existence of a Network is synonymous with Ac-
tion on its behalf ” (2000: 172). A similar obser-
vation can be made about the halal network in 
Malaysia and beyond. Th e network is an exam-
ple of “institutionalized utopianism” (3) rather 
than an actually existing or complete social 
form. As we shall see, halal network events are 
important because they are signs of how orga-
nizations and institutions actively play roles in 
and thus comprise a global halal network and 
through this are embedding a particular global 
Islamic imagination. In business, connections 
and networks frame social interaction; that is, 
these connections form networks that extend 
into all kinds of diff erent organizations and in-
stitutions that make up society (Moeran 2005: 
99). As we shall see, halal certifi cation and logos 
on products are essential to the halal network. 
Julie Guthman (2007) shows how food labels are 
operationalized, arguing that these are expres-
sions of neoliberalization; these labels signify 
the creation of markets, value, and regulation. 
Food labels are political forms of economic pro-
tection that excludes the noncertifi ed/standard-
ized (2007: 461). Moreover, labels are governed 
by nontransparent public-private partnerships 
leading to radical governance mechanisms and 
property rights (473). In sum, I combine theo-
ries about capitalism, embeddedness, and net-
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works to explore how the halal commodity form 
is given shape in global markets.
Globalized halal markets
Th e global halal trade annually amounts to $632 
billion and is rapidly growing (AAFC 2011). 
Th e Koran and the Sunna (the life, actions, and 
teachings of the Prophet Muhammad) exhort 
Muslims to eat the good and lawful that God 
has provided for them, but there are a number 
of conditions and prohibitions. Muslims are 
expressly forbidden to consume carrion, spurt-
ing blood, pork, or foods that have been con-
secrated by any being other than God himself. 
Th ese substances are haram and thus forbidden. 
Ritual slaughtering entails that the animal be 
killed in God’s name by making a fatal incision 
across the throat. Another signifi cant Islamic 
prohibition relates to wine and any other in-
toxicating drink or substance that is haram in 
any quantity or substance (Denny 2006: 279). In 
the modern food industry, several requirements 
have been made in relation to halal food, for 
example, to avoid any substances that may be 
contaminated with porcine residues or alcohol 
such as gelatin, glycerin, emulsifi ers, enzymes, 
fl avors, and fl avorings (Riaz and Chaudry 2004: 
22–25). Aspects of context and handling are in-
volved in determining the halalness of a prod-
uct. Th e interpretation of these questionable 
areas is left  open to Islamic specialists and state 
institutions such as Jabatan Kemajuan Islam 
Malaysia (JAKIM) or the Islamic Development 
Department of Malaysia. In the end, however, 
the underlying principle behind the prohibi-
tions remains “divine order” (2004: 12).
For some Muslims, halal sensibilities necessi-
tate that only Muslims produce halal commod-
ities, and that this type of production is kept 
strictly separate from nonhalal production. In 
Malaysia, foreign companies are legally required 
to set up a Muslim Committee in order to handle 
halal properly. Jeti, for example, does consultancy 
work for such foreign companies in Malaysia on 
how to set up the Muslim Committee.
Within the last decade or so, a large body of 
literature has explored the globalized halal mar-
ket—for example, Johan Fischer’s (2008, 2011, 
2016) work on halal production, trade, regula-
tion, and consumption. Th e edited volume Halal 
Matters (Bergeaud-Blackler et al. 2015) shows 
that China is emerging as a powerful player in 
the globalizing halal market/network. As we 
shall see, Chinese networks play an important 
role in imagined Malaysian halal networks. An 
important study is on urban Muslims in China, 
the Hui. Halal food and eating stood out as the 
most important identity marker in contradis-
tinction to the surrounding Han majority. Be-
sides nutritional and economic functions, food 
and eating practices expressed values and traits 
that they regarded as fundamentally Hui (Gil-
lette 2000: 114). Th us, halal networks also condi-
tion and are themselves conditioned by identity 
formation and geopolitical imaginations.
In the rapidly expanding global market for 
halal products, Malaysia holds a special posi-
tion: it is one of the few countries in which state 
bodies certify halal products, spaces (shops, 
factories, and restaurants), and work processes. 
In shops around the world, consumers can fi nd 
state halal-certifi ed products from Malaysia that 
carry distinctive halal logos. Globally, compa-
nies are aff ected by the proliferation of halal that 
to a large extent is evoked by Southeast Asian 
nations such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Brunei, and Th ailand.
Halal commodities and markets are no lon-
ger expressions of esoteric forms of production, 
trade, regulation, and consumption but part of 
a huge and expanding globalized market. Mus-
lim dietary rules assumed new signifi cance in 
the twentieth century, as some Muslims began 
striving to demonstrate how such rules conform 
to modern reason and the fi ndings of scientifi c 
research. Another common theme in the revival 
and renewal of these dietary rules seems to be 
the search for alternatives to what are seen to be 
Western values, ideologies, and lifestyles. Th ese 
reevaluations of requirements and prohibitions 
are prominent, fi rst, in postcolonial Islamic cul-
tures such as Malaysia, and second, among dias-
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poric groups for whom halal can serve as a focal 
point for Islamic movements and identities (Es-
posito 1995: 376).
Why halal networks and entrepreneurs?
On 16 August 2004, Malaysian prime minis-
ter Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi offi  cially 
launched the fi rst Malaysia International Halal 
Showcase (MIHAS) in Kuala Lumpur. Th e title 
of the prime minister’s speech was “Window to 
the Global Halal Network” (Badawi 2004). He 
argued that establishing Malaysia as a “global 
halal hub” was a major priority for the gov-
ernment, and that MIHAS was the largest ha-
lal trade fair to be held anywhere in the world. 
Badawi asserted that halal products are increas-
ingly being recognized globally as clean and safe 
in an era of diseases and “health disasters” due 
to “unhealthy practices.” Britain in particular 
was presented as being a highly lucrative market 
for halal. In Badawi’s speech, he stressed that the 
vast majority of the population in Malaysia con-
sumes halal on a daily basis. Th e self-assuredness 
of this statement can be ascribed to the fact that 
the state in Malaysia has systematically regulated 
halal production, trade, and consumption since 
the early 1980s. Malaysian state bodies such as 
JAKIM regulate halal in the interfaces between 
Islamic revivalism, the state, and consumer cul-
ture (Fischer 2008, 2011).
Th e concept of the network prescribes a spe-
cifi c way of engaging with the embeddedness of 
economic activity within the context of broader 
social, cultural, and political relations. For ex-
ample, the lives of Malay seafarers in Liverpool 
are examples of transnational connections in 
existence before the global era. Th is group of 
Malays were part of extensive maritime net-
works shaped by the movements of ships and 
commodities that brought these seafarers to 
Liverpool. Moreover, from the 1970s onward, 
Malay students were sent on scholarships to 
study in the United Kingdom. Th ese groups 
have become central to state conceptions of 
national identity in Malaysia; this sort of “dias-
pora” is idealized in journalism, the movement 
called the Malay World, as well as in academic 
research, with varying degrees of political pa-
tronage. A signifi cant theme relates to the possi-
bility of retaining key traits of Malay culture and 
identity outside Malaysia while maintaining 
links with the homeland. One example of such 
cultural and religious continuities is newspaper 
reports about the necessity of the availability 
of halal meat used in the preparation of Malay 
food (Bunnell 2007).
Another and more historical study chal-
lenges the narrative of Malay identity devised by 
Malay nationals, writers, and fi lmmakers in the 
late colonial period. Th is narrative associated 
Malayness with static and ethnically homoge-
nous village life. Th is study shows that this nar-
rative ignores the immigration of Malays from 
outside the peninsula to participate in trade and 
commercial agriculture, the substantial Malay 
population in towns and cities, as well as the 
reformist Muslims who argued for a common 
bond in Islam, that is, cosmopolitan narratives 
of Malayness (Kahn 2006). However, to my 
knowledge, no study explores the Malaysian 
state’s eff orts to develop and dominate a global 
market in halal commodities through network-
ing entrepreneurs in the diaspora.
Th e halal vision of the Malaysian state is 
infused with such ideas about network society 
and hubs embedding a particular global Islamic 
imagination. For example, in the Ninth Ma-
laysia Plan 2006–2010, Together towards Excel-
lence, Glory and Distinction (EPU 2006), which 
outlines the country’s development strategy, 
the strategic uses of the terms “network” and 
“networking” seem to be inspired by Castells’s 
idea that networking expands in the entire so-
cial structure. Strategically, these terms are 
employed as part of an eff ort to target specifi c 
priority areas such as communications and in-
ternationalization of the government led by the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 
the dominant political party in Malaysia since 
independence from Britain in 1957. Th ey are 
also invoked in the context of Malaysia as an 
emerging “global halal hub.” 
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At MIHAS 2004, Badawi proudly announced, 
“Today we will mark the unveiling of a new 
standard for Malaysia—a Muslim standard for 
the world.” Th e prime minister was referring to 
the launch by the Malaysian Institute of Indus-
trial Research and Standards (SIRIM) of a Ma-
laysian Standard MS 1500, General Guidelines 
on the Production, Preparation, Handling, and 
Storage of Halal Foods. Ideally, this new stan-
dard should further strengthen Malaysian state 
halal certifi cation in its eff orts to cooperate with 
multinational companies.
On SIRIM’s website (www.sirim.my), “our 
networking” is illustrated as a grouping or 
cluster of Malaysian state institutions: the Ma-
laysian Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation, the Malaysian Technical Coopera-
tion Programme, and JAKIM. In the fi gure, this 
“networking” also involves the World Associa-
tion of Industrial and Technological Research 
Organizations (WAITRO), the Global Research 
Alliance (GRA) and International Standards 
Worldwide (ASTM). Most of all, this “network-
ing” assumes the form of an arbitrarily shaped 
cluster. It appears that the model or illustration 
of “networking” on SIRIM’s website is incom-
plete; it is an idealized form of networking and 
does not generate any kind of dimensionality. 
Th e specifi c institutions are not visually linked 
or connected, which creates a “cluster” structure 
rather than generating a sense of dimensionality 
as network eff ect or shape. While there is plenty 
of outside space in which this network could 
expand, the commercial linkages are lacking. In 
other words, this is exclusively a vision of future 
“institutional networking.” Networks cannot be 
free from the ties that imagined them (Green et 
al. 2005: 807).
Patricia Sloane’s work on the relationship be-
tween Islam, modernity, entrepreneurship, and 
networking moves beyond universal images of 
entrepreneurship and explores this as an ur-
ban Malay middle-class or elite phenomenon 
in Malaysia (1999: 12). Th ese groups of Malay 
entrepreneurs in Kuala Lumpur (comparable to 
the entrepreneurs involved in halal) are actively 
engaged in strategic “brainstorming” sessions 
about who they could access in their networks 
for support and to form alliances and business 
ventures (122). Th ese entrepreneurs used the 
English words for “network” and “networking” 
found in scholarly studies such as that of Castells, 
on the Internet, and in popular business maga-
zines that are in abundance in urban Malaysia 
(121). Malay entrepreneurs negotiate between 
their newly acquired wealth and Islam; that is, 
the pursuit of wealth in Islamically approved 
ways is central to modern Islamic identity for-
mation (71). Similar to what I shall show in con-
nection with halal network events, it is oft en at 
social events that networking takes on its great-
est power (124). Contacts and access to powerful 
UMNO-connected executives and their capital 
in many cases determine success among select 
groups of Malay entrepreneurs (200).
To sum up, the Malaysian state idealizes the 
halal network as a metaphor through which 
technical systems and institutions (hubs) and 
bodily processes (proper halal handling by Mus-
lims) are imagined and made to stand for each 
other (Otis 2001). At the same time, the state in 
Malaysia actively tries to make politicians, com-
pany representatives, and entrepreneurs such as 
Jeti play particular roles in the halal network. 
Th e Malaysian proliferation of halal gives rise 
to aspirations of Malay Muslim networks and 
capitalism to signify the connectedness and 
prescriptions of organizations vis-à-vis more 
deep-rooted networks such as historical Islamic 
trade networks or Chinese networks. Undoubt-
edly, networks such as business or production 
networks are more pervasive today in terms of 
advertising, production, and consumption than 
ever before in history. Most of all, perhaps, the 
network metaphor and how it is entangled with 
the halal economy has become a social impera-
tive as well as strategic model of identifi cation and 
emulation that in my case from Malaysia is em-
bedding a particular global Islamic imagination. 
Halal embeddedness in Malaysia 
and beyond
Th e proliferation of modern halal in Malaysia 
and beyond is entangled in ever-more complex 
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webs of religious, political, economic, ethnic, 
and class signifi cance. Economically, Malaysia 
has sustained rapid development within the past 
three decades, and the meaning of Islam has be-
come ever-more contested in that period. Ma -
laysia is not an Islamic state, but Islam is Malay-
sia’s offi  cial religion and is professed by more 
than 50 percent of the population, that is, ethnic 
Malay Muslims. Th e Chinese are the second-
largest ethnic group in Malaysia. Th e rise of re-
vivalist Islam in Malaysia from the 1970s has 
had a powerful bearing on the regulation of 
Malaysian halal and how this economy is em-
bedding a particular global Islamic imagina-
tion. A number of divergent dakwah (literally, 
salvation) groups in the wider resurgence of 
Islam emerged in Malaysia. Dakwah is also sup-
ported by Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), the 
Islamic Party of Malaysia. In order to preempt 
these confrontations, the state aggressively en-
gages in an amalgamation of Malay ethnicity, 
modernity, and Islam. Aft er coming to power 
in 1981, the charismatic and outspoken prime 
minister Mahathir Mohamad set off  the wave 
of institutionalizing and regulating halal, thus 
actively nationalizing the proliferation of halal 
and concentrating its certifi cation in the realm 
of the state, where it has remained. 
Th e outcome of attempting to preempt dak-
wah was a powerful UMNO-driven ethnic state 
nationalism. Moreover, the channeling of priv-
ileges and funds through ethnic UMNO corpo-
ratism has been systematically institutionalized 
in Malaysia, and this has led to a form of party 
political (millennial) capitalism controlled by 
the Malay elite (Gomez 1994). Th is type of cap-
italism is eff ectively promoted as a capitalism 
that adheres to Islamic standards. Th e economy 
thus fused with a politics of ethnicity that in it-
self was defi ned in terms of religion (Shamsul 
1999: 43). Th ese points are important in order 
to understand how the UMNO-led state pres-
ents the halal network to be pure and proper 
in public, while the halal industry in Malaysia 
is inseparable from UMNO links and elite net-
works. Companies controlled by the govern-
ment, government-linked companies (GLCs), 
fi gure prominently in the Malaysian halal busi-
ness, and these GLCs are entangled in a web of 
UMNO and personal linkages. 
Jeti works closely with JAKIM through Per-
satuan Pengguna Islam Malaysia, or the Muslim 
Consumers Association of Malaysia (PPIM), 
which is an organization that protects the inter-
ests of Muslim consumers and entrepreneurs. 
PPIM also runs a café in Kuala Lumpur that 
provides shelf space for PPIM members’ (halal) 
products, and PPIM and its café is an essential 
space for Malay Muslim entrepreneurial net-
working. Th e networking and activities of PPIM 
and its members that take place in the café do 
not directly involve the state, but PPIM’s role is 
essential in order to understand the prolifera-
tion of halal in Malaysia: ways in which Malay 
Muslim interest groups network and protect 
Malay Muslim privileges through promoting 
Muslim products and businesses and halal in 
particular. In other words, groups such as PPIM 
and its network constantly push for increased 
Muslim consumer protection and privileges the 
state is seen to be unable or unwilling to deliver.
In the 1970s, the state launched the New Eco-
nomic Policy (NEP) to improve the economic 
and social situation of the Malays vis-à-vis the 
Chinese in particular. Th e NEP entailed several 
benefi ts for the Malays and other indigenous 
groups, such as increased ownership of produc-
tion and preferential quotas in the educational 
system. Ideologically, the overall objective was 
to produce an educated, entrepreneurial, mo-
bile, networking, and shareholding Malay mid-
dle class, or “New Malays.” Jeti is an example of 
such a New Malay entrepreneur.
Historically, Malaysia has played a central 
role in arguing for an indigenous origin of the 
Southeast Asian idea. Th is self-conscious cen-
trality is based on communications and Islamic 
trade networks, and the Malacca Straits area 
has always been a meeting place of ports and 
portages, making Malaysia a booster of South-
east Asian unity (Reid 1999: 7). Moreover, the 
networked nature of Islam and the impact of 
Muslim networks on world history are central 
(Cooke and Lawrence 2005: 1). Similarly, pow-
erful Chinese networks divided into linguistic 
tribes organized the trade of commodities across 
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Southeast Asia (Reid 1999: 11). Malaysian lead-
ers have been very interested in building re-
gional organizations such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Today, there 
is strong cooperation and competition on halal 
among many of the ASEAN countries. Among 
the political elite in Malaysia, there is a powerful 
desire to discover or maybe even in a positive 
sense invent a “Malay diaspora,” embedding a 
particular global Islamic imagination. Th e par-
ticularity of this “diaspora envy” vis-à-vis the 
Chinese in particular signifi es modern Malay 
diaspora aspirations toward cosmopolitan-
ism and global reach (Kessler 1999: 23). In all 
of this, there is a strong echo of national rec-
ollections of a classic Malay golden age of the 
fi ft eenth-century Malacca sultanate and trade 
center of global reach (31). Malaysian halal net-
works give rise to aspirations of Malay Muslim 
networks to signify the connectedness and pre-
scriptions of organizations vis-à-vis more deep-
rooted networks such as historical Islamic trade 
networks or Chinese networks or negative ste-
reotypes related to the post-9/11 consolidation 
of the country’s position as a moderate Islamic 
state. Hence, post-9/11, the powerful state and 
corporate halal discourse in Malaysia identifi ed 
this “moderate” Muslim country promoting a 
global halal network embedding a particular 
global Islamic imagination.
Halal network events in Malaysia
Th is section explores how the Malaysian halal 
network has been promoted at two major ha-
lal events in Malaysia, namely, the Malaysia 
International Halal Showcase (MIHAS) and 
the World Halal Forum (WHF), a gathering of 
Islamic, political, and commercial notables in 
Kuala Lumpur. Th ese network events are prod-
ucts of concerted eff orts by Malaysian state in-
stitutions to include organizations from around 
the world. Since its start in 2004, MIHAS has 
developed into an annual halal network event. 
In the eyes of the Malaysian state, halal pro-
ducers and traders, and a plethora of Islamic 
organizations, the increase in network events 
indicates the emergence of a global halal net-
work embedding a particular global Islamic 
imagination. MIHAS 2006, “themed” as “Net-
working, Consolidating and Energising,” was 
held at the massive Malaysian International Ex-
hibition & Convention Centre (“the Jewel at the 
Southern Metropolitan Hub,” as this convention 
center is dubbed). 
MIHAS consisted of three main activities. 
First, seminars were held by companies such as 
Tesco and Malaysian state organizations such as 
MATRADE and JAKIM. Participation in these 
seminars provided me with insight into the ha-
lal vision in the interfaces or gray zones between 
the state, business, and religious revivalism. We 
learned that Malaysia should be alert to com-
petition from skilled “networking nations” such 
as Brunei, Singapore, Th ailand, and Indonesia. 
Consequently, the government has established 
32 MATRADE1 offi  ces worldwide, an “over-
seas network,” including an offi  ce in London. 
When I discussed Malaysian challenges with 
“networking nations” with MATRADE’s trade 
commissioner in London, he explained that the 
dominance of Th ai ethnic cuisine was a partic-
ular concern. Second, MIHAS included “trade-
matching programmes” and “networking ses-
sions” in which producers, traders, and buyers 
could come together. Th e day before MIHAS 
started, in one of Malaysia’s largest newspapers 
in English (Star 2006) Badawi declared that gov-
ernments and companies should use MIHAS 
to help establish Malaysia as a halal hub. Many 
other articles and newscasts stressed the power 
of halal networking. Th ird, MIHAS included 
many product demonstrations and samples. 
Th ese product demonstrations testifi ed to the 
fact that, in Malaysia, halal has also proliferated 
into a wide range of nonfood products such as 
care products and medication. 
As one would expect, MIHAS was an essen-
tial arena for networking and embedding diff er-
ent kind of activities, in particular with respect 
to exchanging business cards and connecting 
people/organizations, and I was soon to receive 
e-mails advertising new products and announc-
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ing new halal trade fairs around the world. 
Th e entrepreneurs I met at MIHAS, including 
Jeti, refl ected the ways in which networking is 
involved in Malaysian halal. I also had the op-
portunity to meet Jeti at the Halal Exhibition at 
the World Food Market held in London in No-
vember 2006, which had developed into a sig-
nifi cant network event in which a MATRADE 
delegation also participated. 
At the Halal Exhibition, Jeti envisaged halal 
as giving Malaysia an edge and a “niche trade 
network,” whereas Europe and the United States 
otherwise dominate global trade. Th e news that 
Nestlé had entered into a halal business deal 
with Malaysia was proof to her that it was only 
in cooperating with multinationals and using 
their existing trade networks that a country 
such as Malaysia could succeed. Jeti was confi -
dent that the emerging halal trade was “forging 
New Malay networks” on a global scale. Unlike 
the Chinese, Malays were traditionally “con-
fi ned” to Malaysia. Now there was the political 
will to promote Malaysia in terms of halal in-
ternationally, and this was indicative of a major 
shift  toward a more global attitude. In essence, 
these last points refl ect the materialization of 
an entrepreneurial New Malay mentality that 
to a large extent is a product of the NEP as a 
sort of ethnic network policy of the Malaysian 
state. In many ways, Jeti is the quintessential 
Malaysian performer of the halal network: she 
is a young, socially and physically mobile Ma-
lay woman who networks between state institu-
tions, Islamic organizations, and companies; she 
possesses extensive knowledge of proper halal 
production, trade, regulation, and consump-
tion, and uses products and communication 
technologies such as social networks and mo-
bile phones as network tools. Interestingly, Jeti 
was not herself very particular about halal in 
her everyday life, and she was not wearing the 
tudung (long headscarf) on any of the occasions 
I met her. Like many of the other entrepreneurs 
involved in the halal network, she is not a dak-
wah activist but rather a modern entrepreneur 
who tries to optimize Malaysian halal on the 
global scale.
In 2006, the World Halal Forum (WHF) was 
held for the fi rst time in Kuala Lumpur. Th e es-
tablishment of this network event signifi es the 
diversifi cation and multiplication of halal net-
work events in Malaysia. In 2010, Halal Malay-
sia Week included the World Islamic Economic 
Forum, WHF, World Halal Research (an event 
with the heading “Inspiring Innovation through 
Research”), MIHAS (now mainly a halal trade 
fair), and a workshop on the Halal Awareness 
Programme (training on halal production and 
logistics). At each of these events, the corpo-
rate sector, including entrepreneurs, academia, 
NGOs, Islamic organizations, and governments 
from around the world, actively enact the exis-
tence of a halal network, embedding a particular 
global Islamic imagination. Aft er having done 
fi eldwork at these network events since 2006, 
I have become part of the way—that is, deeply 
embedded in the activities—halal networking 
takes place. An example of this is how Malay-
sian state representatives and companies are in-
terested in my research results on halal, while as 
a researcher I am considering access to interest-
ing data that these actors can provide.
I was at WHF 2010 held at the luxurious 
Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre in central 
Kuala Lumpur. Th is network event is now the 
major event for the halal industry globally. In 
his opening speech at WHF, Malaysia’s prime 
minister, Mohammad Najib, who succeeded 
Badawi in 2009, explained to the more than eight 
hundred delegates that the gathering of halal in-
dustry stakeholders provided the best “platform 
for networking among those interested in the 
halal industry.” We learned from organizers that 
WHF was established to be an arena for discus-
sion, networking, and collaboration to stimulate 
the growth and development of the halal market, 
embedding a particular global Islamic imagina-
tion. In the WHF program booklet, breaks were 
designated for “networking and refreshments” 
as well as salat (prayer). Jeti, together with other 
participants, explained to me that Najib’s “po-
litical goodwill” toward supporting halal was 
considered lower than that of his predecessors, 
and his speech at WHF 2010 was anxiously an-
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ticipated. At WHF, one of the organizers specif-
ically addressed the confusion caused among 
companies and certifying bodies by the friction 
between JAKIM and Halal Industry Develop-
ment Corporation (HDC),2 calling for a strong 
“master plan” and “leadership” applicable to all 
stakeholders in the industry to address the in-
ability of government agencies to work together. 
At the end of WHF, delegates were given a ques-
tionnaire and asked to evaluate the networking 
performance of WHF. 
Th e halal network is intimately tied to Ma-
laysian network events. Th e Malaysian halal 
network is largely enacted through and at these 
halal network events since 2004. Today, there 
are halal network events every week globally. In 
Malaysia, imagined halal networks always in-
volve some form of location and are thus both 
political and moral constructions of space and 
place that are never free from the political, com-
mercial, and religious ties that imagined them. 
MIHAS, WHF, and other national halal events 
are part of a more global halal network embed-
ding a particular global Islamic imagination, 
and it is to this point I will now turn.
Halal networks on the global stage
I now explore the Malaysian halal network and 
how it is embedding a particular global Islamic 
imagination on the global stage with particular 
reference to London as my main fi eldwork site. 
Th e reasons for focusing on Malays in multieth-
nic London are, fi rst, that the Malaysian state’s 
vision of and commitment to promoting the 
halal economy specifi cally identifi es London as 
a center for halal production, trade, and con-
sumption, and second, that London is home to 
a substantial number of Malays and Malaysian 
organizations such as UMNO and MATRADE. 
Th e Malaysian state’s vision to export its na-
tional model of halal embedding a particular 
global Islamic imagination is a bid to cultivate 
and civilize London as a “wilderness” in which 
halal production, trade, certifi cation, and con-
sumption are seen as chaotic, disorderly, and 
undeveloped. Cultivating the wilderness signi-
fi es a new era for the ummah (the community 
of Muslims), now reconceptualized as ethical 
Muslim producers, traders, and consumers, as 
well as the revival of the golden past of Islamic 
trade networks.
In November 2005, the fi rst Halal Exhibi-
tion at the major World Food Market (WFM) 
was held. Th e venue was ExCeL London, a 
major exhibition and conference center in the 
Docklands, an area in the southeastern part of 
the city that has been redeveloped principally 
for commercial and residential use. In 2006, a 
delegation from MATRADE had a booth at the 
Halal Exhibition for the fi rst time. Many booths 
sold a wide variety of fresh, chilled, and frozen 
halal food products such as meat/poultry, sau-
sages, samosas, kebabs, bread, fast food, baby 
food, nuts, candy, and dry fruits. Some of these 
products were certifi ed with logos displaying 
and identifying the certifi er, but many were not. 
A large number of companies and Islamic orga-
nizations were represented at the Halal Exhibi-
tion, including Jeti’s company.
Despite the fact that Malays in London are 
outside the direct gaze of the Malaysian state, 
Malay groups seemed to some extent to be 
united or linked through forms of UMNO orga-
nization in London. A particular event that took 
place early in my fi eldwork was signifi cant. Th is 
event refl ects forms of Malay(sian) social, polit-
ical, and economic organization in a diasporic 
context. In August 2006, the Malaysian High 
Commission arranged a Malaysia Day Carnival 
and UMNO branches from all over the United 
Kingdom gathered at a Malaysian research cen-
ter outside London. Each UMNO branch over-
saw a food stall selling (halal) food to a large 
number of guests. In his opening speech, the 
high commissioner of Malaysia to the United 
Kingdom declared that to achieve Vision 2020, 
imagining Malaysia as a fully developed na-
tion by the year 2020, exchanges between the 
United Kingdom and Malaysia are essential. 
In the foreword to the Programme Book of this 
event, the high commissioner argues that Ma-
laysia Day Carnival was an event that strength-
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ened the bond of friendship and “networking” 
among Malaysians in the United Kingdom, pro-
viding an opportunity for the Malaysian High 
Commission, Malaysian private sector, and va-
rious UK organizations to promote Malaysia. 
Th is network event also involved the Malaysian 
Business Forum, as well as the Overseas Malay-
sian Executive Council and several producers of 
Malaysian halal products. 
On 11 November 2006, I was at Malaysia 
Hall in Bayswater, an area of west London that 
is one of the city’s most cosmopolitan areas, for 
a talk by the managing director of Khazanah 
Nasional, the Malaysian government’s strate-
gic investor in new industries and markets. Its 
main objective is to promote economic growth 
and make strategic investments on behalf of the 
government, which would contribute toward 
nation building. Th e scene on which this was 
played out was a highly formal and “national” 
conference room with pictures of the Malaysian 
king, queen, and the present and former UMNO 
prime ministers, as well as the Malaysian na-
tional fl ag. My informants explained to me that 
the speaker was a very important person who 
“controls” a lot of funds in the interfaces be-
tween the Malaysian state and GLCs worldwide. 
When the speaker entered the room, the orga-
nizers humbly bowed, and as the talk was about 
to start, a few of the participants returned from 
praying in the prayer room next door.
Convincingly, the managing director dis-
cussed visions and initiatives the Malaysian state 
together with the government-linked compa-
nies were, and still are, putting in place to make 
the best of globalized markets and business op-
portunities. “Inshallah” (God willing) is added 
when hopes for a bright economic future for 
Malaysian national capitalism are expressed. Th e 
speaker explained to the audience how foreign 
direct investment, human capital, networking, 
sustainability, and transparency are all essential 
in the global world of business today. Most of 
all, it is important to locate strategic “niches in 
value chains” for Malay(sian) entrepreneurs to 
exploit, and this is particularly so within infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT), 
tourism and Islamic fi nance, and halal. Aft er 
this talk, Malaysian halal food was served in the 
adjoining canteen. Th e above network events 
testify to the way in which the Malaysian state 
in the local context of London enacts the global 
halal network embedding a particular global 
Islamic imagination. A plethora of halal com-
modities and discourses meets in London and 
fi lters into the everyday understandings, prac-
tices, and contestations of halal among Malay 
entrepreneurs in the diaspora.3 
Entrepreneurs at work in London
In contrast to how the state in Malaysia has 
eff ectively certifi ed, standardized, and bureau-
cratized Malaysian halal production, trade, and 
consumption since the early 1980s, a whole 
range of competing Muslim diaspora groups 
characterizes the fragmented and complex halal 
market in the United Kingdom. While the “sec-
ular” state is largely absent in halal in the United 
Kingdom, the Malaysian state is very much 
present in the everyday lives of Malay Muslims 
in Malaysia. In London, the Malaysian prolifer-
ation of halal gives rise to aspirations of Malay 
Muslim networks through the work of Malay 
entrepreneurs, and the network metaphor has 
become a social imperative or strategic model 
of identifi cation and emulation embedding a 
particular global Islamic imagination. 
Jeti runs several consultancy fi rms that help 
Malaysian companies with the process of halal 
certifi cation and regulation in Malaysia and 
globally, especially in the United Kingdom, 
where she lives for extended periods of time. 
She explained that the global market for halal 
really took off  when supermarkets and hyper-
markets such as Carrefour, Giant, and Tesco 
started to focus on halal. Multinational compa-
nies now recognize halal as an important and 
profi table new market, and this fact is also fu-
eling the halal vision of the ethnicized state in 
Malaysia and of entrepreneurs linked directly or 
indirectly to it. During one of our discussions of 
the global halal market, Jeti indicated that she 
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wanted to learn more about how to deal with 
“sensitive” issues such as religion and ethnicity 
in the market for halal in Europe. In Malaysia, 
it is not a problem or “off ensive” to do surveys 
on halal, religion, and ethnicity because ha-
lal here is inseparable from the support of the 
ethnicized state. Conversely, in Europe and the 
United Kingdom in particular, inquiring about 
whether Muslims are properly involved in the 
production, trade, and handling of halal can be 
“sensitive” and “off ensive.” 
From my research, I know that many compa-
nies in Europe and elsewhere have been baffl  ed, 
to say the least, about JAKIM inquiries about 
how Muslims are or should be involved in halal 
in order to ensure the halalness of production, 
trade, and consumption. Jeti explained to me 
that exploring the market for halal in London 
has nothing to do with “segregating or catego-
rizing Muslims and Christians,” but merely is 
market research that focuses on a particular 
segment of religious consumers in order to 
“give them what they need, satisfy their needs—
what’s wrong with that? It’s ridiculous that as a 
manufacturer you can’t target a certain segment 
in the market.” Jeti works with companies that 
produce sauces, pastes, herbal products, baby 
food, and dried fruit, among other things. She 
takes on clients and products to “tap into the 
global halal market” and “pushes” them to be-
come “fully certifi ed.” As a consultant “I deter-
mine when a company is ready for certifi cation. 
It’s business development with a focus on get-
ting the product ready for the world market.” 
So in order for these Malay-produced goods to 
enter European supermarkets and hypermar-
kets they must be certifi ed, and as a consul-
tant Jeti helps UK companies with this process. 
When considering the advantages of Malaysian 
companies in the global market for halal, Jeti 
argues that these “really understand what halal 
is and they can answer any question to ensure 
the halalness throughout the supply chain and 
this is a comfort to consumers.” However, these 
companies need the global marketing, invest-
ments, and distribution networks of multina-
tionals such as Tesco in order to export their 
products. 
Another part of Jeti’s consultancy work is 
to assist companies in the proper placement of 
JAKIM halal logos. “Most of the time,” JAKIM 
is fl exible about the placement of the logos, and 
Jeti, JAKIM, and the company in question “sit 
down and discuss” this issue. Th e placement of 
the logo “also depends on the market: in Europe 
and the UK we normally put the logo at the back 
to make it less prominent whereas in Malaysia 
we make it prominent because people don’t feel 
threatened.” Jeti is also involved in halal product 
innovation with companies, that is, replacing 
questionable animal ingredients with vegetable 
halal ones, for example. Th ese processes and 
procedures are all part of the everyday regula-
tion of halal commodities, but they also help 
promote a global Islamic imagination in which 
the ummah is understood as a network of em-
bedded ethical Muslim producers, traders, and 
consumers. In sum, the halal economy and the 
networks sustaining it is to a large extent a ques-
tion of state or political backing.
Conclusion
Polanyi (1944) found “market society” to be 
disembedded from sociocultural networks. 
However, my ethnographic material shows how 
a form of Polanyian embeddedness through 
imaginations of halal networks in Castells’s un-
derstanding comes into existence. Th e imag-
ined global halal network conditions the halal 
commodity form and the emergence of a novel 
form of globalized halal capitalism. An import-
ant theme is economics in relation to Islam and 
Malaysia’s role in the global market for religious 
commodities, and this point demonstrates how 
embeddedness plays out in the global halal 
market. Halal commodities and practices are 
not only deeply embedded in broader social, 
cultural, and political relations. Indeed, em-
beddedness is part of promoting and marketing 
halal products through networks, national aspi-
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rations, and by entrepreneurs: halal is branded 
and marketed as modern and pious commod-
ities in the interfaces between broader social, 
cultural, and political relations embedding a 
particular global Islamic imagination. Now cap-
italism is adjusting to the recent requirements of 
a growing number of Muslims, and the Islamic 
market is expanding rapidly. Consequently, ha-
lal also signifi es a type of globalized religious 
market that covers new types of commodities 
and services. Several of these new commodi-
ties, for example, the products Jeti has helped 
companies produce and certify, were present at 
the WFM in London. Th e proliferation of halal 
in London sits uneasily between an economic 
dimension linked to investment and trade: the 
Malaysian vision to become a world leader in 
halal and the globalization of a Malaysian na-
tional halal cuisine and a future to a large extent 
nourished by political and Islamic diasporic as-
pirations. Simultaneously, global capitalism is 
making peace with cultural diversity. 
I have shown how the Malaysian state pro-
motes its vision of a halal network, enabling 
Malaysia to sell halal commodities through the 
business of ethnic Malay Muslim entrepreneurs 
globally. Today, modern halal is part of a huge 
and expanding globalized market in which cap-
italism, Islam, and the state are entangled, lead-
ing to a combination of business management 
principles and Muslim practice. Th e existence 
of a halal network is fueled by the revival and 
expansion of ancient Islamic trade networks 
vis-à-vis powerful networks of the other. More-
over, 9/11 boosted the state and corporate halal 
discourse in Malaysia, identifying Malaysia as a 
“moderate” Muslim country and key player in 
the global halal network. Th e halal network is 
intimately tied to Malaysian and global network 
events, that is, the Malaysian halal network is 
largely enacted through and at these halal net-
work events. Th e emergence of more and more 
diff erent types of halal network events signifi es 
the diversifi cation and globalization of these 
events. Imagined halal networks always involve 
some form of location and are thus both politi-
cal and moral constructions of space and place 
that are never free from the political, commer-
cial, and religious ties that imagined them. 
Halal in Malaysia cannot be divorced from 
economic growth, the emergence of large groups 
of Malay Muslim middle-class entrepreneurs 
and consumers, and centralized state incentives 
to strengthen halal production, trade, and con-
sumption. Bureaucratically certifi ed halal by the 
ethnicized state fuels visions and eff orts to de-
velop and control the halal market as an eco-
nomic, religious, and political network. In other 
words, halal networks embedding a particular 
global Islamic imagination and the active net-
working that sustain them play important roles 
in the Malaysian vision to become a world 
leader in halal that is also nourished by political 
and Islamic diasporic aspirations. 
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Notes
 1. Malaysia External Trade Development Corpo-
ration (MATRADE) is Malaysia’s national trade 
promotion agency.
 2. Th e Halal Industry Development Corporation 
(HDC) was established in 2006. Its main pur-
pose was to take over JAKIM’s responsibilities 
and coordinate the overall development of the 
industry (www.hdcglobal.com). 
 3. Th e British national census carried out in 2001 
showed that 49,883 Malaysians were recorded 
residing in the United Kingdom.
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